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Our perceptions of the world are dominated by conceptual polarities. We 
are accustomed to visualizing social reality in terms of either dichotomies1 
or continua that are, in actuality, dichotomies in disguise. By the latter, 
we mean dimensions of observation where the contrast between the two extreme 
points provides the basis for the construction of conceptual categories, and 
for the generation of predictive and/or narrative statements. All points 
between the poles are expected to behave accordingly. Those that "misbehave" 
are regarded as impurities which, while inconvenient, do not negate the . 
overall validity of the model, and which, for all practical purposes, can be 
disregarded. It is precisely these marginal areas of social reality that 
constitute the major focus of this paper. 
These spaces between conceptual poles are marginal at two distinct, yet 
interrelated levels: perceptual and epistemological. The former refers to our 
perception that they are unimportant, insignificant and negligible with 
respect to what we regard as the core of social and economic reality. The 
latter refers to the inability of prevailing theoretical approaches to detect, 
enumerate, evaluate, ascribe meaning to, and derive meaning from these blocks 
1 Such as: militant vs. industrial society (Spencer), Gemeinschaft vs. 
Fesellschaft (Tennies), folk vs. urban society (Redfield), mechanical vs. 
organic solidarity (Durkheim), charismatic vs. legal- rational leadership 
(Weber), and traditional vs. modern society (modernization theory). 
of reality.* We will not pursue the question of causal precedence between 
these two levels of marginality; to do so would lead to some of the 
epistemological traps that we warn against. Instead, we hope to show that 
perceptual and epistemological marginality simultaneously produce and 
reproduce each other. 
How, then, can the margins be incorporated into the mainstream of 
sociological inquiry? The answer, we believe, lies in critically reviewing 
and, whenever necessary, rebuilding theoretical approaches and methodological 
tools, in view of their relevance to the margins. In the first section of 
this paper, we attempt to briefly review those aspects of the "social science 
project" that have contributed to the marginalization of important aspects of 
social reality. The last section takes us towards a theory of the margins by 
examining them as a problem of knowledge, understanding and theory. , 
I. MARGINS OF THEORY: A NARRATIVE DEFINITION OF THE MARGINS 
At this point, we have yet to establish a clear definition of the 
margins. W e  believe that a full definition needs to include not only what 
they are, but also, how they became what they are. What follows is a brief 
review of those moments in the recent history of the production of 
sociological knowledge that contribute toward such a "historicized" 
definition. 
2 Teodor Shanin ["~xpoliary Economies: A Political Economy of the Margins 
- Agenda for the Study of Modes of Non-Incorporation as Parallel Forms of 
Social Economy," Journal of Historical Sociolouv Vol. 1, No. 1 (March, 1988), 
pp. 107-1151, coins the term "expoliary" to capture these two levels of 
marginality. At the perceptual level, "expoliary" means "external to the 
polis when, like in ancient Greece, the polis stands for the state as well as 
for origins of the market society. At the epistemological level, expoliary 
means "external to the poles of prevailing analytical scales". 
We have already referred to the role of dichotomous thinking as a 
necessary condition for the creation of margins. It is, however, by no means 
sufficient. All non- critical and non-self-conscious observation, after all, 
involves a certain amount of dichotomy deriving from the juxtaposition of the 
Self (with appropriately drawn boundaries that might incorporate person, 
family, race, gender, nation, "the civilized world", etc.) and the Other. The 
dichotomies that have dominated sociological thought from the nineteenth 
century onwards can all be interpreted as variants of this juxtaposition. 
Such Ego-centric dichotomizations of the world lead to specific 
epistemological evils. Referring to a particularly pervasive version of 
-_ - ethno-centric dichotomization, namely, the picture of the world as painted by 
modernization theory, Eric Wolf argues as follows: 
By casting such different entities as China, Albania, Paraguay, 
Cuba, and Tanzania into the hopper of traditional society, it 
simultaneously precluded any study of their significant 
differences. By equating tradition with stasis and lack of 
. development, it denied societies marked off as traditional any 
significant history of their own. 3 
The above can be said, not only of modernization theory, but of other 
versions of progressivist theory as well. In general, progressivism has 
reduced the history of the world to the history of the "progressive" pole of 
the dichotomy which is nothing but the Self from the point of view of the 
producers of historical knowledge. The social groups that Wolf refers to as 
"people without history" are conceptually very similar to our definition of 
the margins: Both are specific instances of the Other. 
What, then, is the added ingredient which transforms mere "otherness" 
into marginality in the specific sense in which we use the term? The margins, 
we argue, are not merely the Other, but they comprise the Other that has 
3 Eric Wolf, Burope and the Peo~le Without Historv. Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1982, p. 13 
failed to develop along a prescribed path. In other words, marginality is a 
historicized version of otherness. In this historicization the margins are 
denied their own histories. They enter the stage as expendable extras and not 
. as actors in their own right. 
The historicization of otherness can be traced back to the birth of 
evolutionary/progressivist thought. Shanin argues that during the nineteenth 
century, the accumulation of anthropological accounts of non-Western societies 
combined with the "discovery of prehistory" and the consequent extension of 
historical time, to pose a serious intellectual problem. He points to the 
paradigm of evolutionary progress as the stone that killed two birds in the 
sense that it solved, in a single stroke, the dual problems posed by social 
change and by the simultaneous existence of multiple forms of social 
organization: 
The diversity of forms, physical, biological and social, is ordered 
and explained by the assumption of a structurally necessary 
development through stages which the scientific method is to discover. 
Diversity of stages explains the diversity of forms. 4 
Thus, the Other was no longer simply an arbitrarily defined and 
artificially homogenized category, but it was, in addition, locked into a 
necessary and inevitable path of social change prescribed by the predictive 
powers of a newly-developing "science" of society. 
The "people without history" were thus being assigned a historiography. 
This was, however, a historiography drastically different from that of ~ u r o ~ e ~  
in that it was constructed upon predictions deriving from European experience, 
rather than upon gbservations of actual local developments. It was, in other 
words, a hegemonically constructed historiography. 
4 Teodor Shanin, 
pf Ca~italism. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983, p. 4. 
5 Here, we adopt Shanin's somewhat humorously offered definition of Europe 
as including North America but not, say, Bulgaria (Late Marx, p. 249). 
In short, social and economic forms that developed according to the 
predictions of either Marxist or non- Marxist versions of progressivism have 
come to constitute the core of observed and studied social reality. Needless 
to say, these two versions of progressivism are at odds as to the ultimate 
stage of the necessary and inevitable path of progress. They do, however, 
converge on the prediction that the market and/or the central bureaucratic 
apparatus will eventually dominate all social and economic relations. 
The core, then, comprises those sets of socio-economic relations based 
on large-scale mass-production, supported by the job-system of specialized and 
time-oriented wage labor. They are mediated by the commodity form, market 
mechanisms, bureaucratic formalization, and/or central plans; and are 
supervised, regulated, and protected by the state. The margins, on the other 
hand, are those sets of relations that have "failed" to succumb to the 
onslaught of mass-production, formalization, and state regulation. Since, as 
mentioned earlier, the historiography of the Other is predictive rather than 
observational, these sets of relations have been relegated to the ash-heap of 
history regardless of their actual path of development. 
Within all confemporary social formations, there are pockets of economic 
activity and related social relations that operate outside of the mediating 
and regulating functions of the core institutions. Furthermore, these areas 
of social reality are not merely vestiges of archaic forms; neither do they 
show signs of being on the way to extinction. To the contrary, some of these 
structures have increased in importance in recent years, and have shown signs 
of consolidation and resilience. 
Below are some examples of structures and relations that have "defied" 
progressivist predictions: 
1. Peasant forms of production have "failed" to give way to capitalist . 
relations in as uniform a fashion as was predicted by orthodox Marxism. This 
became clear in Europe as early as the end of the last century, and created 
considerable theoretical confusion within the German social democratic 
movement .6 More recently, a number of studies have provided specific examples 
of the persistance of non-capitalist relations in the face of agrarian 
capitalism. For example, Harriet Friedmann has shown that there were social 
and economic conditions that favored household production of wheat over 
capitalist production, in an era of expanding wage relations. Likewise, 
Shanin has forcefully argued that in response to expanding capitalist 
relations, Russian peasants did not neatly polarize into capitalist farmers 
and landless rural  proletarian^.^ On a more recent note, there is evidence to 
suggest that the development of capitalism in rural Turkey proceeded parallel 
with the consolidation of small, owner-operated farms. 9 
2. More damaging to the progressivist paradigm, the predicted sweeping 
concentration has failed to occur in industry as well. Advocates of 
anarchistic socialism called our attention to this counter-evidence already in 
the last decade of the last century.10 Artisans and craftsmen buried alive by 
6 For the debate between Kautsky and Vollmayr and the subsequent attempt 
by Kautsky to come to grips with the problem, see P. Goody (ed.) Karl 
Kautskv:~. London: McMillan, 1983. 
7 Harriet Friedmann. "World Market, State, and Family Farm: Social Bases 
of Household Production in the Era of Wage Labor." Compara+,ive Studies in. 
Societv and Historv, Vol. 20, No. 4, (1978) pp. 545-586. 
8 Teodor Shanin. The Awkward Class. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1972. 
9 Caglar Keyder. "The Cycle of Sharecropping and the Consolidation of 
Small Peasant Ownership in Turkey." Journal of Peasant Studies Vol. 10 
(January/April, 1983), pp. 130-145. 
10 P. Kropotkin. Fields. Factories and Worksho~s Tomorrow. London: George 
Allan and Unwin, 1974(1889). 
progressivism have survived and in many respects represented and still 
represent a historical alternative to mass-production. 11 
3. Within the capitalist Third World, a host of family-run or otherwise 
self-employed forms of economic activity, such as petty-trading and personal 
service provision, dominate the squatter-settlements of large metropolitan 
centers. Generally referred to as the informal sector, this category of 
economic activity has increased over the years, to become a permanent and 
characteristic feature of underdeveloped capitalism . l2 Although no longer 
possible to ignore, this sector of economic activity and its accompanying 
social and political relations are still not sufficiently theorized. 
. 4 .  In even the most advanced capitalist formations, there are areas of 
economic activity such as housework, cooperative living, child-care pools, and 
other' forms of informal or non-regulated labor relations, incorporating both 
the service and the productive spheres, that have not been penetrated by the 
commodity form, and/or by state rec~ulation.'~ 
1 1  Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin ["~istorical Alternatives to Mass 
Production: Politics, Markets, and Technology in Nineteenth-Century 
Industrialization." Bst And Present No. 108 (August, 1985), pp. 133-1761 
argue the historical case; M.J. Piore and C. Sabel  h he Second Industrial 
Divi de. New York: Basic Books, 19841 build a case for the current' relevance 
of these forms. 
12 For a discussion of the impact of this sector on class structures, see 
Alejandro Portes, "Latin American Class Structures: Their Composition and 
Change During the Last Decades." Latin American Research Review Vol. 
20(1985), pp. 7-39. For a significantly different interpretation of the 
implications of the informal sector for Third World political economies, see 
Hernando De Soto, The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World, 
New York: Harper & Row, 1989. 
13 For a review of the classic debate on housework under capitalism, see 
Maxine Molyneux, "Beyond the Domestic Labour Debate," New Left Review, No. 116 
(1979). For a more general treatment of the "margins of advanced capitalism", 
see A. Portes and S. Sassen-Koob, "Making It Underground: Comparative Material 
on the Informal sector in Western Market Economies," American Journal of 
50~1010~y Vol. 93, No. 1 (July 1987), pp. 30-61. For a comparative treatment 
of the informal sector under developed and underdeveloped capitalism, see A. 
formal Eco Portes, M. Castells, and L. Benton (eds.) The In now: Studies in 
The above are a few examples of the margins of capitalism. 
5. State socialist formations have their own margins: Various forms of 
informal labor exchange have persisted within, and adapted themselves to the 
socialist regime. In the Soviet Union which has carried out the most 
aggressive and coercive agrarian collectivization program in the world, thirty 
percent of the total agricultural product is currently produced on private 
plots which constitute less than two percent of total arable land.14 
The "submerged" or "unofficial" economy in the Soviet Union is not 
limited to agriculture. Private artisan production of such items as plastic 
bags and knitwear is blossoming outside the centrally planned and 
bureaucratically regulated economy. 15 
The margins are contemporary structures rather than anachronistic 
survivals. They have not merely persisted despite predictions to the 
contrary, but they constantly change in order to continue to reproduce 
themselves in a changing world. For example, in the Tepito district where 
Mexico City's informal petty trading and contraband activities are 
concentrated, one of the important forms of livelihood is the small-scale sale 
and repair of modern electrical appliances. 
In other words, these activities make use of the very structural 
transformations (such as technical innovation and large-scale 
industrialization) that were predicted to bring about their demise. As such, 
they pose a challenge to theoretical approaches which view large structures as 
Advanced and Less Developed Countries. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, Forthcoming. 
14 Zhores Medvedev. Soviet Asriculture. New York: W.W. Norton, 1987. 
15 Konstantin Simis. U.S.S.R.: The Correct Society. New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1982. 
purely disabling individual actors. Instead, they suggest the usefulness of 
an approach that views structures as simultaneously enabling and disabling. 
As we pointed out above, these structures change in response to changing 
national and world conditions. However, they do so with inputs from local 
resources and from numerous individual innovations. The combination of these 
ingredients endow the margins with a distinct historical dynamic of their own. 
11. TOWARDS A THEORY OF Margins: THE MARGINS AS A PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE, 
UNDERSTANDING +ND THEORY 
The above examples are, by no means, a systematic review of possible 
types of marginal structures. Nevertheless, several shared dimensions begin 
to emerge, and promise to pave the way toward a systematic approach. 
1. Economic activities in the margins lack a structural tendency toward 
accumulation. Put slightly differently, their aim is simple, rather. than 
extended reproduction. Given a dominant political philosophy that equates 
absence of growth with stagnation and eventual decline, it is not difficult to 
see that the perception of the margins as extinct or disappearing structures 
is ideologically constructed rather than observed. 
The kind of accumulation that is most characteristic of marginal 
economies is not economic but qocial accumulation. People produce to 
accumulate security, prestige, or human capital. In many cases, one 
accumulates trust or social credit through the activity itself. For example, 
this is the case in community help, or other forms of labor exchange. 
2. The margins are localized. Within them, social and economic 
relations rely heavily on physical proximity, face-to-face interaction, and 
affective ties. Furthermore, they are, in important ways, shaped by local 
peculiarities and idiosyncrasies. Yet, as demonstrated by the home-working 
lace-makers of rural India whose products find their way into European 
department stores, the margins are, by no means, isolated pockets within the 
world system. 16 
An effective line of research needs to focus equally on their localized 
nature and on their ties to world markets. This has been difficult to 
accomplish due to a prevailing assumption that structures are either totally 
cosmopolitan, or totally vernacular, but never a combination of both. We 
believe that this dual nature of the margins can be addressed by first noting 
that the localized aspect centers around production, while the distribution of 
goods and services are frequently carried out through a network which connects 
into world markets. This suggests a line of research which distinguishes 
between relations of production and distribution, and investigates their 
interrelationship without conceptually subordinating one set of relations to 
the other. 
3. Labor in the margins is deployed in a task oriented rather than in a 
time oriented manner. The discipline of the factory clock does not keep 
marginal labor in its grasp. Therefore, the margins can utilize residual 
labor, a flexibility the core does not possess. 
The unit of labor deployment and control is typically located at a level 
of aggregation in between the individual (i.e. micro-level), and the level of 
the core institutions such as the labor market or the central bureaucracy 
(i.e. macro-level). In most cases, this intermediate level is the household, 
16 Maria Mies. "The Dynamics of the Sexual Division of Labor and 
Integration of Rural Women Into the World Market," in Lourdes Beneria (ed.) 
Women and Develo~ment: The Sexual Division of Labor in Rural Societies, 
. . 
New 
York: .Praeger, 1982. 
though it could conceivably be the village comunity, the urban neighborhood, 
or some other community of shared interests. 17 
In any case, the relations of production that are dominant in the 
margins are under-theorized. Political economy has generally focused on 
relations of production within the context of macro-structures; those were 
perceived as the only legitimately 5 . s  relations of production. Household, 
neighborhood or community relations of production were relegated to the domain 
of the "natural", and hence, were considered outside of the domain of 
political economy. This is one possible theoretical blind spot which 
inhibited the development of a political economy of the margins. 
4. Economic activity and social interaction in the margins follow sets 
of organizing principles and logical structures that are distinct from the 
logic of core institutions. Yet it is important to keep in mind that 
prevailing models of social and economic action are permeated by the logic of 
core institutions. For example, such concepts as "systematic", "rational" or 
"deliberate" have no intrinsic meaning independent of core institutions. They 
are tautologically and somewhat arbitrarily defined as those types of behavior 
that conform to the logic of the core. In other words, "systematic" actually 
refers to behavior that can be generalized and aggregated.through the 
application of prevailing models of economic behavior. Likewise, "rational" 
means behavior that can be understood and explained through the prism of these 
models. 
Be that as it may, such terms have been uncritically used to refer to 
intrinsic aspects of behavior, rather than to aspects of behavior a 
osed asainst the losic of core institutions. As a result, those sets of 
17 Nanneke Redclift and Enzo Mingione (eds.). Bevond Ern~lovment: HouseholL 
Fender and Subsistence. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985. 
relations which we call the margins appear as unsystematic, irrational or 
nondeliberate action, almost by default. This perception removes them from 
the domain of legitimate study, and dumps them in a residual category usually 
referred to as "noise" or "the error term". 
CONCLUSION 
We have reviewed some of the theoretical blind- spots that make it 
difficult to detect and to study the margins. In doing so, we posed the 
margins as a challenge to some of the prevailing theoretical approaches, and 
suggested ways in which those approaches night be altered to incorporate the 
margins into the body of sociological knowledge. 
In particular, we have tried to show that those structures that appear 
as peripheral within a world-systems perspective, also embody sets of 
relations which can be characterized as "core". Likewise, formations that are 
the core of the capitalist world-system, also have their margins. Arguing 
along these lines, the foregoing analysis can be further developed to pose a 
challenge to the view of the world as painted by a modernist perception of 
social space. 18 
It is important to note that this discussion is not intended to propose 
a dichotomy between the core and the margins. We do not believe that such a 
duality exists in any real sense. The border separating the core from the 
margins is an epistemoligical one: It separates those sets of relations that 
18 For arguments along similar lines, see Saskia Sassen-Koob, 
"Recomposition and Peripheralization at the Core," Contem~orarv Marxism Vol. 5 
(Summer, 1982), pp. 88-100; and Renato Rosaldo, "Ideology, Place, and People 
Without Culture," Cultural AIIthr0~010UV Vol. 3, No. 1 (1988), pp. 77-87. 
prevailing sociological models can comfortably accomodate from those for which 
such an accomodation is problematic. 
We have proposed ways in which to deconstruct mainstream discourse in 
an effort to explain the marginalization of large and increasingly important 
blocks of social reality. In doing so, we hope to pave the way for a 
conceptual reconstruction which can help sharpen our understanding, not only 
of the margins, but also of the core. 
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I. Everyday power and everyday resistance 
The literature on everyday resistance introduced us to 
a new concept of power by pointing to new sources from which 
power can emanate. To show how foot-dragging, refusing to 
pay taxes and sticking to certain symbols can serve as 
"weapons of the weakn is to remind us that the "weakn are 
never automatons, never completely powerless, and that there 
always exists an irreducible margin of freedom that allows 
us to exercise our human agency. It is important to 
understand these small hidden reserves of freedom, the 
different forms of 'small time' or micro power, because 
often they constitute the real limits of 'big time power', 
that is the power embodied in corporate actors, most 
importantly in the State and its coercive apparatus. 
Everyday resistance makes do without organizing, forming 
trade unions, guerilla units, political parties or without 
any form of concerted collective action. In circumstances 
where organization is impossible or impractical these tiny 
pockets of individual discretion may become the only way 
people have to assert their own interests. 
The concept of everyday resistance, however, carries a 
serious danger. Our insistence on finding resistance in 
"trivial" places can make us lose our sense of proportion, 
an appreciation of true powerlessness in the face of 
enormous odds and can trivialize the courage and resolve 
often necessary to resist effectively. I can't help 
2 
recalling my grandfather telling me proudly, that when the 
German troops marched into our district in Budapest in 1944, 
he was standing in front of our house watching the 
formidable stream of troops moving down our street. The 
crowd was standing on the sidewalk, silent and confused. 
Suddenly my grandfather made an obscene gesture toward the 
passing soldiers. There were several people who took notice 
of it. It wasn't completely riskless, and the message it 
conveyed was loud and clear. Yet I would hesitate to 
compare my grandfather with people who took up arms or who 
were hiding Jews in their homes. I would even hesitate to 
compare him to my other grandfather, who escaped from a 
labor camp where he had been drafted as a Jew, and who spent 
the rest of war underground, skillfully shuffling my 
grandmother, my father and his sister around from hiding 
place to hiding place, showing up always a few hours before 
the Nazis came to search the place. He saved two out of 
three. The difference between the two acts of resistance is 
in what they achieved. This is by no means a point to be 
ignored. 
The danger of identifying power everywhere is that we 
can lose sight of the enormous differences in power that 
make the weak weak and the strong strong. In fact, one must 
keep in mind that power is a relational concept and that, if 
the issue of contention is well defined, whoever has more 
power has power, and whoever has less power does not have 
power at all. What everyday resistance teaches us is that 
3 
might always defines itself more broadly than the sphere it 
can actually master. It demonstrates that the different 
domains of power are not linked automatically. The Nazis 
could occupy Hungary, but could not prevent my grandfather 
from venting his anger, and they could not prevent some 
people to inform my other grandfather where the next raid 
was going to occur. 
A. Fragmentation of power 
The domains of power are segmented and gaining control 
over one's life in certain matters may not help winning 
command over others. However, once we recognize the 
autonomy of different power domains, we cannot have it both 
ways: we cannot assume that power is fragmented and in the 
same breath claim that small time power can automatically be 
turned into big time power, or that discretion in one aspect 
of everyday life by necessity implies freedom in others. 
Just because the Communist government has the power to build 
factories and to force people into them, does not mean that 
it can keep labor discipline as well. But by the same 
token, workers -- who can often successfully resist certain 
aspects of harsh factory discipline of forced socialist 
industrialization, who can get away with absenteeism and 
shoddy work, and who can thus spare their energies to attend 
to their own business after work -- do not necessarily have 
the freedom to negotiate their wages, to preserve their 
health and improve their job conditions, or to choose their 
colleagues or bosses. Above all it does not necessarily 
give them the power to change the factory regime that makes 
the discovery of these freedoms necessary. Only because 
they are already forced into the factories do they need the 
freedom of dodging factory discipline. 
B. Marginalism of everyday power 
This leads us to the second problem, that everyday 
resistance is always resistance on the margins. And the 
margins are set by the powers that be. 
To illustrate this marginalism of everyday power let me 
quote from an interview with a previous chairman of an 
agricultural kolkhoz in Hungary, who described what happened 
after he had returned from a Soviet POW camp in World War 
11, and was put in charge of an agricultural cooperative 
forced on his village: 
I recalled the words of the commander of the POW 
camp, a very conscientious man, who used to be the 
deputy head of GUM [the largest department store in 
MOSCOW]. He told me: "Wherever we set our foot 
capitalism disappears and only socialism can exist. I 
had to realize that set against this huge country and 
political system I am not even a speck of dust, I also 
had two kids, why should I have argued? Everything 
would turn red in this country, so [when they asked me] 
5 
I agreed to organize the cooperative. No one younger 
than seventy came anyway, my wife was in tears, so was 
my father-in-law... Then they gave us the first plan. 
The plan required us to keep thirty cattle, and grow 
cotton on 42 acres. They were out of their minds! 
Cotton does not grow around here, and who will do the 
work anyway? Was I supposed to hire day labor? I went 
to the local district council to complain, but it did 
not help. Finally I exchanged the 42 acres of cotton 
to 21 acres of seed lettuce with [neighboring] ... 
cooperative. That is better, the women .said, because, 
even though [the lettuce here] grows no seed, at least 
it can be fed to the ducks. Then uncle ~ a l i  [~azekas] 
-- may he rest in peace -- told me: "Listen, the river 
Tisza will be flooding. Let's plant the lettuce next 
to the river, there it will be taken by the devil, 
anyway." You are right -- I said, and we planted 8.4 
acres. One day there came this insurance guy, and 
wanted me to take out insurance. You are my guy, I 
said, and I insured the crop. 
Later on a young, educated man came from [the 
central authorities] to check upon the lettuce seeds. 
He climbed into the ferry boat, and I whispered to 
uncle Miska, the ferryman; uncle Miska, scare him just 
a little bit ! The water was wide, the wind blew, there 
were big waves.... 
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Do you swim ? -- Uncle Miska asked [the young 
fellow]. 
My head is swimming ! -- he answered. 
Either way, let's go -- I pushed. 
I won't go ! -- said [the young fellow]. 
Then I described him the lettuce field in words. 
In the evening he told me confidentially, that he 
understood, and that he didn't worry about us, we were 
smart enough to make a living out of the cooperative. 
The first sign of this was that the insurance paid for 
21 acres of flooded lettuce... You have to dance 
around the numerous and stupid regulations. [~unkosti 
1988 pp.20-211 
The limits of the marginalism of everyday resistance 
are obvious. No one wanted a coop in this village; no one 
wanted to be told what to grow. However, given that these 
conditions had been imposed by the State, it was still 
possible to "dance around the regulations." It was better to 
have a coop right away than to wait, be punished, and still 
be forced to accept it. And it was better to plant lettuce 
that was washed away by the flood, than to plant cotton, 
which would have required a lot of labor and which would not 
have grown in any case. Nevertheless the people who joined 
the coop and planted lettuce benefitted only in comparison 
to an even worse situation, imposed upon them by the plan, 
and not compared to their previous position where they could 
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farm the way they wanted. Before the cooperative, it never 
occurred to anybody in the village that it was a good idea 
to plant lettuce just to get it flooded by the river. 
The marginalism opens everyday power to manipulation. 
Smart enough planners always leave a certain amount of 
leeway for the discreation of the coop chairmen. Planners 
always calculate resistance into their plans. For instance, 
they set targets higher than they actually believe possible 
to achieve and then let the chairmen bargain a lower target, 
which is what the planner wanted to begin with. Even in the 
most authoritarian social organizations, like the military, 
there is a margin of error, which can be factored in without 
jeopardizing the goals the generals want to achieve. 
Segmentation of power domains and marginalism of 
everyday power are two considerations that could reduce our 
notion of everyday resistance to a hermeneutic suggestion, 
to merely another way we can interpret mundane facts of 
everyday life. To avoid that we have to specify the 
different ways everyday power can cumulatively transcend its 
own narrow and trivial domain. We have to find the 
. 
mechanisms through which small time power can turn into a 
force that can contest big time power with the hope of 
success. 
The most obvious way micro power gets collected and 
finds expression at the macro level is through 
organizations. Yet organization is often an option 
precluded, and then resistance must find alternative ways to 
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challenge macro power. I will try to describe three 
mechanisms that can turn the snowflakes of isolated protests 
into avalanches of resistance. These mechanisms mediate 
between micro-level acts and macro-level consequences 
without micro intentions articulating themselves through 
organizations created for this purpose.1 To describe some of 
these mechanisms I will turn to the second economy in 
Hungary. 
11, The second economy 
The single most important and pervasive change that has 
occurred recently in Hungary has been the blossoming of a 
wide variety of economic forms outside the state sector. 
These include small scale agricultural production (household 
farming and even commercial private farming), small, 
artisanal enterprises (tailors, masons, carpenters), 
licensed an unlicensed private services (car mechanics, 
house cleaners, language teachers) family business 
(catering), and forms of informal labor exchange (in 
residential construction and agriculture). Moreover, these 
activities are mostly pursued on a part-time basis, thereby 
allowing people to keep one foot squarely in the State 
economy. The expansion of the second economy has resulted 
in the expansion of income earning possibilities for the 
1 An overview of the problem of micro- vs. macro-level 
phenomena in sociology, and some suggestions about how to 
fill the gap are offered by Wiley [19881, Collins [19881, 
and from a more general perspective Schelling [1978]. 
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population, paying wages two to four times higher than the 
official State sector wages, the rebirth of a limited labor 
market, and the opening up of new spheres of economic 
activity, with each sphere following its own logic of 
operation independent of State guidance. This 'second' 
economy exists in all socialist countries, though to 
different degrees. The theoretical confusion surrounding 
this problem is reflected in the numerous terms coined to 
describe this phenomenon, such as the 'second and third', or 
even 'second, third and fourth', the 'underground', the 
'private', and the 'non-plan' economy. 
A. The second economy as a political concept 
Despite what the name implies, the second economy is 
not an economic but a political category. It is political 
not simply because the activities it encompasses, -- like 
all human activities -- have political content, but because 
the only thing that all these activities have in common is 
political: they are all ways in which people circumvent 
State control over labor by working outside the imposed 
system of State employment. With the exception of certain 
economic constraints imposed on them by political forces, 
the variety of ways private individuals seek material gains 
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in the second economy do not possess a general economic 
logic. 
In economic terms the second economy is best described 
as a space existing either outside or within the interstices 
of the framework of the'official State planned economy, 
which is filled by activities that can survive without the 
institutional, legal and administrative infrastructure which 
can be provided only by the State. 
Participants in the second economy are sometimes 
harassed and even persecuted. Lacking solid and predictable 
institutional protection, the risk operators in the second 
economy face is not so much economic as political. Amid the 
shortages that plague the life of socialist countries, the 
main risk is not whether there is demand for the services or 
the goods of the second economy, but rather whether or not 
the State will decide to increase taxes, decrease and 
control prices, limit private imports or, even to unleash a 
media campaign against profiteers. 
Apart from ideological concerns, the State has good 
reasons to worry about the second economy. This alternative 
economic sphere loosens the State's control over labor. 
Alternative sources of income makes the worker less 
dependent on the State for his livelihood, and gives the 
worker a measure of control over his own life. People -- no 
longer only pawns of an historical transformation imposed on 
them from above,-- have become active agents in this complex 
process of economic and social change as a grass-roots 
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social movement. The second economy has achieved major 
concessions from the State in recent years. 
I am aware that to describe the opening of an 
alternative economic sphere in socialist countries as a 
"social movement" is an unorthodox usage of the concept. 
The traditional literature on social movements has focused 
on collective activit'ies aiming at some common goal which 
participants consciously seek to achieve through some form 
of collective action. Social movements we know well are 
equipped with both self-consciousness and an internal 
organization. 
Until recently, social movements in centrally planned 
and controlled societies were always nipped in the bud. To 
organize in a socialist country seemed highly imprudent. 
First, organization made groups visible and thus vulnerable 
to repression. In Hungary until 1988, organization from 
below has been severely sanctioned by criminal law as 
conspiracy and racketeering; And even when organizations 
succeeded in surviving, it invariably became an instrument 
of control in the hands of the State. Religious 
organizations and trade unions are sad examples of how, 
under certain conditions, 'joining forces' in the form of a 
corporate actor can actually make individual members even 
more powerless. Strength in unity meant the strength of the 
state to control those who united.* 
2 To illustrate, how an organization can turn against 
those who organize, one should consider the decree issued by 
the Presidium of the National Council of Trade Unions, in 
May 1950, which called trade union functionaries not to 
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In socialist societies, the central will has possessed 
an historically unprecedented self-consciousness; it has had 
confidence in its historic mission, a powerful organization, 
an elaborate ideology and a political vision. Apparently, 
then, the only social action that could succeed in creating 
social change challenging the system was action without the 
need for overt aims, for formal organizations or ideologies, 
and which did not have to understand itself in political 
terms. These are "social movements" of atomized resistance 
and at the macro-level, they are "movements of unintended 
consequencesn. Their strategy is, as Foucault has put it, a 
"strategy without a strategist", and, indeed, strategically 
SO. 
Political atomization does not imply the complete 
social isolation of each individual; it simply means the 
absence of organization that can overstep the restrictions 
of informality. The cobweb of kinship and friendship ties 
plays an important role in the day to day functioning of the 
second economy. However, seriously disturbed and strained 
in the rush of industrialization, these informal relations 
are localized, and their content is not political. 
Participants in the second economy follow no distinct 
political values neither do they pursue distinct political 
aims. Manchin [1988] found in a survey that, if anything, 
tolerate tardiness, absenteeism, "strolling around during 
the work day," the underutilization of work-time, leavinq 
one's work early, irresponsible and careless handling of- 
material, tools, machinery and public property, low product 
quality and, finally, liberalism on the part of management 
( ! )  in enforcing discipline and proper work quotas. 
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participants involved in the second economy are more 
'cautious'. People involved in private farming tend to be 
politically somewhat more submissive, probably not wanting 
to compound the risks of private farming with further risks 
of political intransigence. The original and deliberate 
political atomization of society carried out by the 
Communist State is thus reinforced by the second economy, 
which encourages people to improve their own lot 
individually. As Burawoy [I985 pp.197-2001 has pointed out, 
as long as this is possible people are reluctant to pursue 
collective action. 3 
Yet, these individual actions do add up, but the way 
they do depends on the political power individuals intend to 
outwit. 
B. The nature of macro political power in socialism 
The unique feature of State power in socialism is, that 
to a large extent, it is based on the State's direct 
3 In my view Burawoy [pp.200-2021 overestimates the 
difference between the Hungarian and the Polish case. He 
sees Poland, after Solidarity, as the collectivist 
alternative to individualistic Hungary. Burawoy reaches 
this contrast by underestimating the second economy in 
Poland. A comparison of Poland and Hungary would take 
another paper, here I would like to point out that the 
differences between Polish and Hungarian collectivization of 
agriculture, the different historic role played by the 
church in those two countries, State policies towards the 
second economy, and the way the second economy excluded a 
large portion of the population (by adopting the dollar as 
its currency in Poland but not in Hungary) explain why 
pressure towards collectivist strategies was stronger and 
why those strategies were possible in Poland. 
14 
involvement in the economy as the manager of economic 
development and socialist industrialization. This direct 
involvement means that the political and economic roles of 
the State are inseparable. Economy becomes the extension of 
politics -- politics by other means, as the slogans and 
names of socialist factories persistently remind us. The 
politicization of the economy turns society into one taut 
system where everything is related to everything else. This 
creates both advantages and disadvantages for the State. 
Just as all the victories of socialist industrialization 
become monuments to the superiority of socialism, all the 
economic failures are blamed on the system, and ultimately 
on the Communist State. The chief advantage of the 
politicization of the economy is that it allows for the 
permanent mobilization of people and resources. The chief 
disadvantage of such a taut system is that the damage of 
each breakdown is harder to contain and isolate. 
Yet, I am not concerned here with the so called ripple 
effect, frequent in taut systems, in which a micro event 
acquires macro consequences through an amplifying chain of 
events. The story of the lost horse shoe that was lost for 
want of a nail, which resulted in the loss of the horse, 
then the rider, then the battle and finally the loss of the 
kingdom. is quite instructive. The ripple effect describes a 
chain 0.f events which makes one tiny event influence large 
 outcome^.^   his paper addresses mechanisms where many 
- -  - 
4 Another example is the story of Michael Kolhaas by 
Heinrich von Kleist, which describes how the personal 
similar and isolated micro events of resistance reach macro 
significance without the participants coordinating their 
5 act ions. 
111. ~echanisms of aggregation 
The aggregation of micro power does not necessarily . 
lead to the victory of the weak. In fact, in most cases 
aggregated micro power is just one of the factors involved 
in a conflict. In the following examples, therefore, I will 
not claim that the aggregated micro powers themselves forced 
the State to change its policies, my attempt is more modest, 
I will try to show that the accumulation of the multitude of 
everyday powers did and can forcefully influence macro-level 
decisions. 
A. The Imprisoner's Dilemma: Bureaucratic Aggregation 
If a huge number of individuals misbehave, there comes 
a point when punishing them becomes very costly, both 
politically and economically. This is an aggregating 
mechanism which is bureaucratic in nature. If enough people 
resist, this can force the State to erect a punitive 
grievance turns into an all-out peasant rebellion. In 
physics, chaos theory tries to model this phenomenon [Gleick 
pp.11-31.1 - - 
5 Demography is yet another area that studies the macro- 
consequences of the aggregation of micro-level decisions. 
Demography also dispenses with the notion of organized 
act ion. 
apparatus which in the end becomes too costly and dangerous 
to maintain. 
In the 1950s to push through forced industrialization 
the Communist State set out to draw the entire economy under 
its control. This involved the twin task of building up 
industry and forcing peasants out of agriculture. This 
inevitably involved coercion. 
The basic contradiction which socialist 
industrialization had to resolve was carrying out a massive 
industrialization and concentration of production without 
allowing labor to turn into a commodity, as had happened in 
capitalist development. The Communist master plan could not 
allow workers to sell their labor 'freely' through a labor- 
market for several reasons. First, the Communist leadership 
was ideologically hostile to any form of the market. 
Second, it felt it needed complete control over the labor 
allocation process and it preferred direct administration 
over the indirect allocation through the market. But the 
most important reason why the labor market had to be 
abolished was that the labor market was incompatible with 
the rapid, centralized accumulation which was the principle 
objective of socialist industrialization. 
An efficient labor market is impossible unless central 
planners are able to provide the necessary economic 
incentives to attract workers into jobs in the socialist 
sector. Historically, industry attracted labor by paying 
wages higher than available in the traditional sector, 
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especially in agriculture. Industry is usually able to pay 
higher wages because concentration in agriculture generates 
rural unemployment and because productivity is higher in 
industry than in other sectors of the economy. In Hungary, 
however, a recent land reform has created a huge class of 
small holder peasants who had no desire whatsoever to leave 
the land they had been dreaming about for centuries. The 
peasants were even willing to accept material disadvantages 
just to be able to stay on the land.6 Furthermore, even 
though industrial productivity exceeded that of other 
sectors, this did not translate into goods that could be 
used as incentives to attract people into those jobs. Those 
incentives were not available because the Communist 
leadership saw its task in pursuing a policy of forced 
accumulation by increasing the share of investment to the 
detriment of consumption. Bricks and cement were used for 
building factories rather than residential housing, 
factories made machines for other factories rather than, for 
the use of households, semi-finished goods like steel, iron 
or industrial chemicals had a higher priority in the overall 
economic plan than did food and clothing. 
The ambitious plans of socialist industrialization 
needed as much labor as possible, but it could not afford to 
6 In 1949 the average income per capita in families of 
wage laborers in the State sector was 296 Fts compared to 
154 Fts in agriculture. 
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pay for it.7 Under these conditions, the State had to create 
a system of State employment in which it could take complete 
control over labor. The State achieved this partly through 
political coercion. 
To herd the population from the countryside into large 
factories turned out to be much more difficult than the 
leadership had originally expected. Peasants were reluctant 
to leave their newly acquired land or join the agricultural 
equivalent of the factory, the kolkhoz, even though they 
were subject to a ruthless system of forced deliveries. The 
socialist tithe cleaned out not only the peasant's pantry, 
but also the seeds and livestock that were necessary to 
produce in the following years. As the amount squeezed out 
of the peasant one year became the base of his delivery 
quota for the next, the peasant usually failed to meet his 
higher quota in the following year. This was seen as 
sabotage, and a manifestation of 'intensified class 
struggle'. The inability of the peasant to meet 
artificially high quotas was punished with stiff prison 
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sentences and hefty fines [~agyar 1986, Zdvada 19861. After 
fulfilling all its obligations, in the draught stricken year 
of 1952 the average peasant family was left with 80 
kilograms of grain to feed itself and for seed, which was 
less than one third of what the average French peasant 
family had had in the eighteenth century [ R ~ V  19871. 
Peasants resisted this enormous burden in various ways. 
Some hid the seeds or the livestock; others devised devious 
ways of showing less land on paper than they actually owned; 
and others simply disappeared when the collectors came. 
Quite a few took matters into their own hands and either 
roughed up the collectors or butchered them with axes, 
scythes, and pitchforks. After the summer of 1952, many of 
the collectors refused to go to certain villages because 
they feared for their lives. 
Those who left the land were at least as much trouble 
as those who stayed. This newly born proletariat stubbornly 
resisted industrial discipline. At harvest time, production 
in factories often came to a halt, as thousands of workers 
failed to show up. Most of them returned to the land to help 
their peasant kin to avoid stiff prison sentences for not 
meeting their quotas [Gyekiczky 19841. These new members of 
the industrial working class had a hard time getting 
accustomed to the time-oriented work which the factory 
required of them and to the miserable working conditions 
which were ruining their health. 
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Many of them returned to the land after the first 
couple of days or weeks, others tried to find a different 
factory job. As of 1950, "arbitrary quitting" -- that is 
leaving a job without the consent of the employer -- became 
a civil, and later a criminal offense. One legal decree 
issued by the Council of Ministers on February 16, 1950, 
(effective as of January 1, 1950 ! )  made any act harmful to 
the execution of the plan punishable with a prison sentence 
up to 2 years. In 1951 the Supreme Court handed down a 
decision that decreed that even "absence from work without 
harmful intent or leave without proper excuse" was covered 
by this law and "should normally be punished by corrective- 
educational labor." [~elhnyi, 1984 pp.14-15, emphasis added] 
The actual penalties usually did not exceed a fine and 
"corrective labor" at the work-place because factory 
management simply could not afford to lose any workers. 
Although in certain cases the offenders were sent to prison. 
In 1952, some 7,000 cases of "refusing to continue 
employment" were brought to trial. 
The penal system was in full swing. Sentences were 
handed down in huge numbers. By 1951 many convicted had to 
wait up to ten months to start their prison sentences, 
because prisons were overcrowded and to relieve the 
overcrowding of the criminal justice system, a new 
'misdemeanor court' was introduced. This new court made it 
possible to quickly prosecute those who had not broken any 
criminal law, but who had not acted with the ardor and 
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discipline expected of a socialist citizen. The misdemeanor 
court was not a court in the true sense, because it was 
operated by the State apparatus. As the official 
clarification accompanying the measure [Szamel 19521 
explained, one of the important innovation of the new 
misdemeanor court was that it simplified legal procedures." 
~xperience shows that with respect to the misdemeanor 
courts, lawfulness is not guaranteed by the multi-level 
appeal system in and of itself. On the other hand, it 
extends the procedure, it creates unnecessary office work, 
and it burdens the State budget to a serious extent." 
rp.421. I 
Table 1 shows that "collective consumption," the 
budget item that covers chiefly military and law enforcement 
expenditures and the costs of State administration, more 
than quadrupled by 1953, compared to 1950, while the 
national income grew only 28%. The size of the State 
bureaucracy was up 64% [CsatAr 1954 p.53.1. 
TABLE 1. 
The Distribution of the National Income (1950=100%) 
Year 
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
Consumption 100 105 112 119 125 128 135 
Households 100 103 98 100 119 125 135 
Collective 100 147 362 462 241 179 138 
Accumulation 100 171 132 169 118 139 37 
National Income 100 116 114 128 122 132 117 
[source: Peto and Szak6cs 1985 p.214.1 
Between 1950 and the end of the first quarter of 1953 
650,000 people were tried and of which 387,000 were 
convicted, and from the beginning of 1951 to May 1 of 1953 
the police issued 850 000 penalties, only 19,000 of which 
resulted in jail sentence [A Magyar Dolgozok... Nehez 
Esztendok... p.5001. The Ministry of the Interior kept 
files on 1.2 million people [Ormos 1989 1. 
The cost of enforcing these Draconian laws was 
enorm~us.~ The natural question to ask is, why the State did 
not enforce the law more selectively by handing out harsh 
8 The Hungarian labor laws were modelled after the Soviet 
Labor Code introduced in the 1930s. The Soviet laws were so 
cruel that not even the legal system was quite prepared to 
carry them out. A campaign had to be launched against 
"liberal" and "slow" prosecutors who engaged in "criminal 
inactivity and direct cover-up." The real explanation is, 
of course, that the legal system was simply overwhelmed. 
From 1940 trials were carried out with one judge, without 
assessors and without preliminary investigation [Nove 1982 
p.263.].(See also Solzhenytsyn's Gulag Archipelago). 
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punishment to a well-chosen few in order to deter others ? 
This was impossible because the political atomization of the 
resistance. Since each person acted on his own, there were 
no ring leaders. Moreover, to follow a strategy of 
selective punishment was also inadvisable, as selection was 
already taking place, except not according to the 
leadership's interest in keeping the population obedient. 
Factory bosses suffering from severe labor shortages were 
reluctant to let anyone to go to jail. Village party 
secretaries whose standing depended on how well their 
regions fulfilled the plan and who were consequently 
dependent on the cooperation of the local population often 
tried to mitigate the harshness of these regulations. The 
problem with selective punishment was that the middle and 
lower level bureaucrats, who had to make the ultimate 
decision concerning who would be punished, could not be 
trusted. Selective punishment would have necessitated a 
very costly monitoring of the selection process. 
Lindblom [I9771 argues that, in what he calls 
"authority systems," once the forces of repression are set 
up, "the marginal cost of control is zero or nearly so. 
Indeed repeated exercise of it often helps to maintain it." 
[p.19]. An idle policeman costs as much as another that is 
making arrest. However, as he himself admits, the original 
setup costs of "authority systems" is usually quite 
substantial. Thus it is not each act of repression that is 
costly but to maintainence of the repressive apparatus 
24 
itself. Precisely because at any given moment the 
employment of the weapons of the repressive arsenal is free, 
these weapons tend to be overused. This, in turn, will 
provide the case for further upgrading the arsenal. The 
process creates an internal momentum for growth in the 
coercive apparatus. 
The thaw following Stalin's death forestalled a 
complete breakdown in the State machinery. In June 1953, 
Imre Nagy announced the New Course in economic policies. 
The New Course brought some temporary results: prices of 
many necessities were reduced, new resources were committed 
to residential construction ( especially in Budapest and 
other, larger industrial cities), and realwages were 
increased. There was a jump in the number of new operating 
licenses granted in the private sector, the pace of forced 
collectivization was slowed, the Labor Code was modified to 
protect the workers' 'right to recreation' by curbing the 
powers of firms to force workers to work overtime. Also, 
some of the Draconian penalties meted out for violating 
labor discipline were eased and some measures were enacted 
to increase work safety and to protect pregnant women and 
young workers [@Habuda 1980 p.45.1 Moreover, the Party 
promised to return to the norms of "socialist legality" and 
vowed to put an end to arbitrariness in the criminal justice 
system. 
The costs of these measure were political as well as 
economic. As an internal Party document pointed out, past 
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practices of legal arbitrariness made the population "less 
trustful" of the leadership, and consequently less 
cooperative and created a climate of unpredictability which 
"hampered the construction of socialism". They also gav'e 
birth to a runaway security apparatus which threatened those 
within the Party and the State administration as much as the 
population at large. 
The multitude of isolated offenses were aggregated 
through the institution of the penal system. The criminal 
file of the south Hungarian peasant who raised chickens and 
hid them from State officials was indiscriminately grouped 
together in the Budapest office of the coercive apparatus 
with the file of,a northern mineworker who left his back- 
breaking work and found employment in a factory. In the 
extended criminal justice bureaucracy--which now included 
many of the State administrative organs--these two files 
attained.a common quality. The most important effect of 
these State efforts to extend its control over the labor 
force was that the 'prosecution of these two cases tended, 
above all, to overburden the judicial bureaucracy and to 
further the expansion of the police apparatus without 
contributing in any substantial way to increasing national 
productivity. 
B. The Market as a Focusing Lens 
The aggregation mechanism can also be economic. The 
market can focus individual decisions and allow them to 
coalesce and exert macro-level pressure on State power. The 
intellectual fascination of markets is precisely that they 
provide a simple model how small instances of individual 
behavior add up to large-scale phenomena by simple 
mathematical aggregation. 9 
In 1968 a New Economic Mechanism was announced in 
Hungary, which was to introduce some market mechanisms into 
the country's planned economy. In the early 1970's the 
Stalinist wing of the Hungarian Worker's Party staged a 
concerted attack on the New Economic Mechanism, and as a 
part of this campaign an attack was unleashed on all forms 
of private production. In early 1973 a series of articles 
castigated, vilified, criticized and condemned both the 
'petty bourgeois or private small-producer mentality' and 
'private greed' .lo There were venomous attacks on private 
9 As Collins puts it:"Market models are not very 
difficult to micro-translate: for a market is precisely a 
set of exchanges among real people in real transactional 
situations. The macro contours of a market are nothing but 
irreducible macro variables: the sheer numbers of exchanges 
of various kinds, which present each individual with a set 
of constrained choices... [p.247. emphasis added]. 
10 The shrill and moralizing style of these attacks is 
well exemplified by Farag6 [I9731 and S6lyom [I9731 two 
columnists of the Party daily ~6pszabadsAg. Farag6 preaches 
"a higher level collectivism", which is able to subordinate 
petty bourgeois private interest to the collective good. The 
real problem as he sees it is that much of this "petty 
bourgeois individualism" falls within the boundaries of the 
artisans, small entrepreneurs, and moonlighters, but the 
most abuse fell on household farming which had brought 
moderate prosperity to the countryside. The propaganda 
contended that working on the private plots kept people from 
fulfilling their obligations to the collective. Some Party 
leaders pointed out that the Party must attend to the needs 
of the working class, who were, they claimed, had been 
slighted by the gains of the peasantry [~erend 1988 p.101. 
The fact that industrial workers were more likely to be 
found among household farmers than peasants was scarcely a 
counter-argument [~ros 1983 p. 12193. 
In 1974 local organs of the State began to crack down 
on all forms of the second economy, .including part-time 
household farming. Suddenly, household farmers found that 
their net taxable income was assessed to be higher than in 
previous years, even though they had not produce any more. 
Many found themselves in the highest tax bracket starting at 
50 000 Fts, in which tax rates were progressive [Punkosti 
law. Sblyom tells the tale of a Party member, who threw 
away his respectable past as a manager and succumbed to the 
devil of greed. He began to borrow money right and left and 
failed to pay the loans back. Why he did what he did 
remains a puzzle to the reader, but not to the columnist, 
whose explanation faults the sickness and drug of greed 
[sic!]. To the relief of all the man was reprimanded by his 
Party peers. Biz6m [1974] finally makes the link between 
egotism and the second economy explicit. In an article 
entitled "What makes a petty bourgeois?" she explains that a 
good Marxist must not look at simply matters of consumption, 
but should think in terms of production. Greed and 
selfishness are only symptoms. What makes the petty 
bourgeois is that he is engaged in "private work, at public 
expense, instead of or within the work he undertook in the 
socialist division of labor.. ." [p.47.]. 
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All this happened at a time when prices of their 
produce were falling. Most of the produce from household 
farms was -- and still is -- sold through government 
wholesalers, who lowered their prices in accordance with 
central directives [~suffa 19751. The State also decided 
that inputs like fodder was too cheap, and acted 
accordingly. 
These household farmers had no organization that could 
represent them in this matter. l1 They could not form a 
cartel; nor did they have any other means of legal recourse. 
In 1967 household farms bred 220 000 pigs, a number which 
had increased to 2.4 million by the first half of 1974. 
 his meant that over 50% of national production of pork was 
produced in the second economy. However, in response to 
this government crackdown, the number of sows dropped by 30% 
by the end of 1974 [Berend 1988 p.131. By the spring of the 
next year the Party revised its policies. The important 
question for us is what made the State change its mind ? 
In response to the new measures, household farmers 
began to slaughter their sows and simply stopped breeding 
for sale. In the fall and winter of 1974 it seemed that 
everybody in the countryside was slaughtering their pigs, 
smoking the meat, and making sausages and crackling. In 
villages pig slaughters are always festive events. 
11 This is not to say that there were no factions in the 
leadership of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party which 
were more sympathetic to peasant concerns.But this 'agrarian 
lobby' was not accountable to its constituency and cannot be 
seen as an organization of the peasantry. 
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Relatives and neighbors help in the kill and in the 
butchering and preparation of the meat. Slaughters are 
usually followed by feasts with plenty of brandy and liquor. 
In every village, people were celebrating. 
But while pantries got filled in the villages, the meat 
supplies in urban stores were rapidly dwindling. Very soon 
the threat of serious meat shortages loomed large in cities. 
This put enormous pressure on the Party from the very 
constituency it claimed to be protecting through these 
restrictive measures: the urban working class. The 
multitude of individual decisions to stop pig farming were 
collected by the lens of the meat market and focused to 
exert pressure on the urban population. At this point the 
State was not faced with the intransigence of this or that 
peasant; it had to deal with a meat shortage and with the 
ire of the urban population. 
C. Implied Threats and Collective ~emories 
The grumblings of the urban population did not force 
the State to change its stance on the second economy simply 
because it recognized the contradiction between its declared 
but dubious intention of championing the interest of the 
working class and the unintended harm inflicted upon the 
urban proletariat by the ensuing meat shortage. In 
socialism, the State was creating the class structure, not 
representing it [Walder 19881. The State ignored real 
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working class interests just as much as it neglected those 
of the peasantry. Why then did the State respond to 
numerous, anonymous and in themselves insignificant 
complaints such as letters to newspapers, rumors, and 
private expression of personal frustration? In the 195,01s 
Hungarians had to survive much worse hardships without the 
State having felt any obligation to alter its policies. 
The State did not relent because thes'e small signs of 
protest had any immediate effect, but rather because of the 
threat they implied. Since the uprising of 1956, the Kadar- 
regime, which was responsible for cruelly crushing the 
revolt, had been acutely aware of the possibility of a' 
violent collective action. The collective memory of the 
uprising which took place in urban areas with the 
participation of the-working class and the intellectuals was 
painfully present in 1974, just as it is today. 
In the early 1970's this awareness was heightened by 
several factors exogenous to the urban meat shortage. Since 
1972 intellectuals, who had in the late 1960's and early 
1970's proposed to revise Marxist orthodoxy -- Marxism with 
a human face -- had been under constant attack from the 
State, at least in part because they invoked the memory of 
the Petofi-circle, a club of revisionist Marxist 
intellectuals who had played a large role in igniting the 
events of 1956. Many of them were disciples of the ~arxist 
philosopher Georg Lukks, who himself played an important 
part in the Petofi-circle. Papers and books on such 
31 
politically seemingly innocuous topics as the philosophy of 
Husserl or Wittgenstein or the world view of the Renaissance 
were viciously attacked by Party hacks, and several of the 
leading members were expelled from the Party and eventually 
from the country as well. 
The 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia gave fresh evidence 
of the Soviet Union's unwillingness to tolerate profound 
internal changes. Hungary in 1973-74, just like in 1956, 
was after a series of cautious internal reforms, which 
somewhat weakened the State. Even though I doubt the 
political elite was familiar with Tocqueville's ideas, the' 
experiences of Hungarian history showed clearly that revolts 
in Hungary occur exactly when repressive political regimes 
begin to reform themselves. 12 
.Political discourse in Hungary in the early 1970s was 
framed in the terms set by the 1956 revolution. However this 
discourse could not make overt any reference to 1956 because 
that would have opened up a flood of grievances against the 
regime in power. It was not in the Party's interest to make 
public reference to what it tersely labelled as 
'counterrevolution'. The articles filled party publications 
couched their tirades in moralistic terms, harping on themes 
of egotism and the neglect of the collective interest. Of 
course, the collective interest was eternally entrusted to 
12 This was the case in 1919, when the Communists took 
power after the progressive bourgeois government.of Count 
Karolyi. It was also the case in 1956, which had begun as an 
attempt to resume the New Course which had been buried in 
1954. 
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the Party-State. The argument was simple to manufacture: 
one just had to move backwards, taking an instance where the 
State's interest was violated, alleging that this was a 
violation of the collective interest, and finally preaching 
against privatization, individualization and greed. These 
attacks were easy to mass-produce since the State had 
successfully atomized society, thereby precluding any 
collective articulation of individual needs. 
In the context of the public memory of 1956 the 
significance of the multitude of small protests gained 
amplified significance. As the peasantry by and large 
stayed out of the 1956 revolution, their dissatisfaction was 
not registered by the Party and State apparatus. Only when 
.they managed to transfer most of the costs of the State's 
restrictive policies onto urban population, did the State 
feel threatened. 
In this case, even though there was no effort to 
channel expressions of dissatisfaction into large and. 
organized protest, the aggregation of small instances did 
occur through the prism of the collective memory. It is 
important to see that the threat of organized resistance did 
not come from the micro actors themselves. The success of 
this implied threat did not emerge from the self-confidence 
of society, that it would be able to join forces if 
necessary. The implicit, unstated threat had given these 
micro protests their effectiveness not because of the bitter 
and heroic memories of the population but because of the 
33  
unpleasant recollections of the political elite. To the 
extent to which the heightened morale by society itself 
played a part in forcing the State to change its stance on 
the second economy, it did so through the effects 
anticipated by the elite and not through its actual 
manifestations. 
IV. Conclusion 
I attempted to illustrate three ways a multitude of 
micro-level everyday power can 'add up', and can influence 
macro-level decision making. Bureaucratic, market and 
cultural mechanisms can serve as proxies for organization. 
There are advantages and disadvantages of being atomized. 
The main advantage is that the diffuse pressure isolated 
resistance can create is very costly to eradicate [ R ~ V  
19871. The fact that macro resistance occurs as an 
unintended consequence of everyday behavior which is hard to 
criminalize deprives macro power of a well defined and 
easily punishable enemy. Atomized resistance can often 
require less .courage and commitment than organized action. 
On the other hand, atomized resistance has numerous 
disadvantages. Its result is much harder to calculate or 
calibrate, it does not foster an overall understanding of 
the situation, and it is often inefficient and rarely allows 
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for complex responses at the macro-level.13 It also tends to 
erode solidarity and other values of community. 
The kinds of everyday powers available to individuals 
however must be viewed in the context of macro power, for 
several reasons. First, if we fail to do that resistance 
can get easily trivialized. Second, the kinds of small 
options open to individuals are always strongly influenced 
by big time power. And finally, if we are seriously 
interested in human emancipation, we must systematically 
address the way micro power can effectively force a change 
against the formidable structures of macro power. 
13 As the large literature on cooperation in game theory 
indicates, atomized action can often lead to suboptimal 
outcomes. The famous prisoner dilemma is a case in point. 
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Typical social science conceptualizations of the relationship 
between the socialist state and peasantry have relied on images of 
a powerful, near-totalitarian state and a passive or sullen 
peasantry. State agricultural policy formation is generally 
depicted as a process relatively autonomous of societal input, 
although it may be influenced by the ruling class, the world 
economy, the internal economic situation, or state ideological 
commitments, depending on the theoretical perspective. Once the 
state has determined policy, it then hands down its decisions to 
peasants who are unavoidably bound by it. The entire picture is 
very "top-down." One of my goals in studying the state-peasantry 
relationship is to alter that portrayal, which I argue 
underestimates the capacity of subordinate actors to play a role in 
shaping their own lives. 
Traditionally, it has been the job of the political scientist 
to study which factors influence the choice of a policy, while it 
has been the task of the rural sociologist or the anthropologist to 
study the impact of that policy on the rural community. What I 
hope to do in my dissertation is to combine the two approaches, in 
a study of Cuban agricultural policy. I am specifically interested 
in state policy towards the private agricultural producers, who 
today cultivate about twenty percent of Cuba's farmland (Benjamin 
et al. 1984). Combining the two traditionally separate approaches 
should help to reverse the top-down image by asserting that the 
response of the peasants to policy in turn represents a constraint 
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on future state policy formation. This paper examines how such a 
perspective might prove useful in addressing some questions about 
state policy formation and the peasant-state relationship in a 
socialist society. 
Post-Revolutionary Cuban Agriculture . 
Pre-revolutionary Cuban agriculture was characterized by a 
large concentration of landholdings in the hands of a few wealthy 
Cubans alongside high seasonal unemployment, tiny and fragmented 
landholdings or even landlessness, and poverty for the majority of 
rural inhabitants. Shortly after the triumph of the revolution in 
1959, the First Agrarian Reform Law was passed, issuing titles of 
ownership to all those who worked land they rented, sharecropped, 
or squatted. Between 1957 and 1966, the number of small private 
farmers actually increased about 110,000 over the already existing 
45,000 small landholders (Pollitt 1979; Benjamin et al. 1984). 
According to Lehmann (19851, private producers obtained a net 
benefit from the revolution, enjoying a greater degree of security 
and an improved standard of living, with relatively few demands 
placed upon them in return. Nevertheless, the small peasants were 
not without their complaints; for most of the first fifteen years 
after the revolution, these private producers suffered from a 
relative lack of credit, technological inputs, and marketing 
opportunities that might have enhanced their operations. They had 
the lowest priority to purchase all sorts of agricultural inputs, 
from tractors to simile watering hoses. They proved nonetheless to 
be more efficient producers of almost every crop than were, the 
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state farms, the other major form of productive organization in 
rural areas (Mesa Lago 1984). 
The state farms, or aranjas del pueblo, were the recipients 
of all the inputs and investment that private peasants lacked. 
These farms were designed as the solution to the question of what 
to.do with the pre-1959 large estates. When the First Agrarian 
Reform Law had confiscated most landholdings over 1,000 acres, the 
state decided not to break up the large estates and distribute them 
amongst the proletar'ianized workers, but instead opted to maintain 
them in large units and treat their workers as state employees. 
These state farms maintained an important ideological edge 
over private peasant holdings. On the former, rural workers 
labored for "the peoplen; on the latter, a family toiled for 
itself. The government, especially in its first idealistic decade, 
therefore heavily allocated resources to the state sector. It also 
attempted to incorporate the private farms, voluntarily, into state 
farms. After 1966, private peasants were subject to ideological 
exhortations to sell their holdings voluntarily to the state 
sector, or to incorporate themselves into one of the two plans 
promoting coordination with state farms. At their peak in 1973, 
these plans involved roughly 25 percent of all private peasants, 
and participation has declined since then (Dominguez 1978:453-4). 
After 1967, the state was legally permitted to evict small 
peasants from their lands if it was thought that state ownership of 
the land was needed to improve productivity, establish industry, 
build dams or roads, or if a small farm was surrounded by a state 
farm. The combination of voluntary sales and evictions reduced 
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private landholdings in Cuba from 37 percent of the arable land in 
1963 to 20 percent by 1977 (~ominguez 1978: 453-5). The trend 
appeared to be towards the gradual dissolution of the entire 
private sector. 
However, in the mid-1970s, state policy underwent an abrupt 
about-face. Almost without warning, private agriculture was back 
in favor with state planners. This was evident in several policy 
changes, but the most notable manifestation of the altered attitude 
was the promotion of private agricultural cooperatives, credit, 
service, and especially production cooperatives. The latter could 
be formed by a group of private peasants pooling their land and 
resources, for which they would later be reimbursed from 
cooperative profits. Members were to receive a share of about half 
of the profits generated each year, after debts and taxes were 
paid. The possibility of forming these new cooperatives was 
embraced with enormous enthusiasm in rural Cuba; the number of 
cooperatives grew from forty-four in 1977 to 1,480 by 1983, with 
some 78,000 members and accounting for 53 percent of privately held 
land  enja jam in et al. 1984). 
Not as far-reaching an organizational reform as some enacted 
elsewhere, such as decollectivization in China, the Cuban 
cooperatives nevertheless did mark a notable shift from past 
policies. This shift raises a number of general questions which I 
will examine in my dissertation, including the following: What 
factors contributed to the policy shift? Why did it take place 
when it did, rather than a decade earlier or later? Why was it met 
with such rapid acceptance by private producers? 
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Reviewing the existing literature on state policy formation, I 
found that although Cuba itself is understudied, there is no 
.shortage of theoretical approaches to explaining policy changes in 
socialist countries. Here I will simply highlight some of the 
major explanations which are most commonly employed. 
The first of these cites an economic necessity at the root of 
most policy reform. This "necessity" may arise either out of the 
inherent inefficiencies associated with trying to plan an entire 
economy, or it may be a result of price.changes for commodities 
sold on the world.market (primarily sugar, in the Cuban case). A 
second alternative is convergence theory, which finds the level of 
technological development of a society to determine more of its 
characteristics than its ideology or history. For convergence 
theorists, the road to modernity includes, among other things, 
increasing "rationalityn in attitudes toward production and a 
corresponding decline in the significance of ideology. The "New 
Class" thesis argues that the intelligentsia, a class which puts 
greater value on efficiency, is replacing the bureaucracy as the 
class with power in state socialism, and policy is shifting 
accordingly. 
Although the specific strengths and weaknesses of these 
approaches vary, two problems stand out. Much of the work done on. 
.state policy is marred by a teleological vision of history, such 
that Cuban policy represents a particular, necessary stage, either 
in the transition to socialism or in the process of modernization. 
Either way, the state has no choice but to act as that stage calls 
for. Convergence theory is certainly the worst offender, but 
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representatives of other approaches similarly assert that Cuba is 
on an historical trajectory which make'certain policy choices 
somehow "inevitable". I would argue, on the other hand, that the 
state does have choices, even if the costs associated with certain 
choices are exceptionally high. 
The other glaring problem with these theories is a strong 
elitist assumption about who shapes policy -- and history in 
general. It is of course true that much of state policy comes 
"from above," indirectly from macroeconomic forces, directly from 
technocrats and party officials. But elite decision makers do not . 
function in a vacuum. On the contrary, they too are constrained 
and shaped by that fact that all human beings make history, 
including the perpetually underestimated peasants. 
Generally social scientists recognize the power of peasant 
action only when it takes the form of overt, violent resistance. 
These extreme cases are the easiest to recognize, but they make up 
only part of the pi.cture of the political significance of peasants. 
At times when peasants are not rebelling, they are hardly passive 
robots submitting to the will and whims of large landowners, or of 
the state. Rather, they are rationally proceeding about their 
work, responding creatively to opportunities to defend their 
interests in a world where they have little power. For the case of 
~uba,'I am making the argument that we can not fully understand 
state policy, neither its formation nor its success or failure, 
without reference to organized and especially gnoraanized responses 
of peasant households to the structures around them. 
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In some settings, organized peasant activity may be extremely 
important to state decision-making processes. However, such 
organization is relatively rare in most socialist countries, given 
the Communist Party's monopoly on political and economic 
institutions. Peasant organization did exist in the early years of 
the Cuban revolution in the form of ANAP, the National Association 
of Small Farmers (Asociacion Nacional de Aaricultores Peauenos). 
Founded in 1961, ANAP was known to be an active lobbyist for its 
peasant members until about the mid 1960s, when its role became 
more of an extended arm of government policy in the countryside. 
More important, in the Cuban case, are all of the unorganized, 
everyday activities through which peasants can have an impact upon 
the state. A few of these can perhaps be understood as resistance, 
of the type suggested by Scott (1985). However, finding symbolic 
resistance in even the most petty activities may not only blind us 
to the distinction between significant and insignificant actions, 
but may lead-us to overlook the numerous instances of compliance 
which are also part and parcel of subordinate behavior. 
Quite apart.from any conscious resistance, peasants undertake 
a number of activities which are nothing more than simple coping 
strategies, activities which in sum have important consequences for 
the state. Interpreting these, and their significance, requires 
attention to the details of peasant life. Peasant actors are 
distinguished from other economic agents in a number of ways; two 
of the most significant are that they are invariably tied to a 
household (that is, a focus solely on the peasant individual is 
methodologically indefensible) and that they produce for 
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consumption as well as exchange. These characteristics give them 
room to manipulate and maneuver, within boundaries, to their own 
advantage. Within the household, labor can be allocated to 
different tasks, depending on how worthwhile one or the other 
appears under current policies. If there are certain advantages to 
employment in the state sector, such as social benefits, one member 
of the household might seek part- or full-time employment there 
while the rest of the household remains responsible for private 
production. Unless a household is involved in a specialized or 
integrated plan, it can decide to cultivate different crops, or to 
reduce the production of an unprofitable good, or reduce overall 
production to only what is required for its own consumption and the 
minimum amount of cash needed. None of these could reasonably be 
considered resistance, but rather strategies peasants have for 
coping, of achieving the Chayanovian balance between the pleasures 
of consumption and the drudgery of work. 
And these strategies do have consequences, often unintended 
ones, for state policymakers. For example, when in the 1960s the 
state lowered the prices of agricultural inputs needed for 
industry, some members of the ANAP protested officially, but the 
prices were not changed. Instead, prices of non-processed food 
products were raised to compensate. The outcome, not surprisingly, 
was that the peasants shifted en masse to the production of 
consumer food crops and created a severe shortage of raw materials 
for industry (Duyos 1964). From the point of view of the peasants, 
they were simply coping with the economic structures in which they 
were embedded, but from the point of view of the state, the 
9 
peasants had created a real crisis that required new pricing and 
procurement schemes. 
What I want to do then, is to ask what strategies of the 
peasants contributed to the rethinking of state policy that 
resulted in the active promotion of private agriculture in the mid- 
1970s. This alternative approach should permit the correction of 
the problems of teleology and elitism I mentioned earlier. But 
perhaps even more importantly, it offers the opportunity to 
. incorporate women into the study of the state and development 
policy. Frequently the studies connecting the two have emphasized 
the impact of some policy on rural women -- which is important, of 
course, but not conducive to recognizing the autonomous political 
power of female actors. Examining the state from the "ground upn 
allows for the incorporation into theory of the household, of 
gendered interests, and of the sexual division of labor. 
Recent studies of Cuban rural women provide an example of the 
way in which gender differences might be important to an 
understanding of the state. One of the incentives attached to 
production cooperatives, once the government decided to promote 
them in 1975, was the availability through them of the materials 
needed for the construction of new agricultural communities; the 
cooperative members simply had to provide the labor. This meant 
that for the first time, rural residents not employed on state 
farms would have access to modern housing with running water and 
electricity. Furthermore, shops, day care centers, health clinics, 
schools, and communal eating facilities were to be constructed in 
these communities. 
In interviews conducted by Deere (19861, rural women reported 
that the improvement in their families' standards of living was a 
major incentive for joining the cooperatives. The state gained the 
support of women and facilitated the mobilization of female labor 
through the construction of the new communities. Additional 
research by Stubbs and Alvarez (1987) has shown that rural women 
. a r e  especially inclined to favor the new cooperatives, for' two 
additional reasons. Women also welcomed the opportunity to gain 
some economic independence from their husbands and fathers, and 
noted that many of the traditionally female tasks are easier and 
more pleasant when undertaken collectively. 
On the other hand, many men are less than enthused about 
relinquishing their individual control of the land and the 
decisions relating to it. Nor do they welcome the increased 
independence of their wives or daughters or the work which brings 
them into the public sphere and the sight of other men  enja jam in et 
al. 1984). That cooperative membership grew nonetheless suggests 
that either women were winning the household debates, or men had 
additional interests in joining that were not captured by Stubbs 
and Alvarez. Either way, this example illustrates the importance. 
of paying attention to micro-level sociological relationships, such 
as those within the household, because it is partially at that 
level that the fate of macro-level social and economic policies are 
determined. 
~ h u s ,  a view of state policy from the ground up may allow us 
to incorporate gender into theoretical realms from which the 
concept has been traditionally excluded. Similarly, I plan to pay 
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attention to race and other distinctions which might illuminate the 
dynamics of peasant responses to state policy. (~xamples might 
include the amount of land held, the crop(s) produced,.age, or pre- 
revolutionary experience.) Taking these things into account allows 
me, on the one hand, to construct a more sociologically accurate 
conception of the peasant actor -- often dismissed as conservative, 
individualistic, and assumed'to be male without further thought -- 
and to understand what interests and resources peasants have to 
draw upon as they cope with a powerful state apparatus. 
By no means do I wish to exaggerate the ability of the 
peasantry to manipulate the political system. Clearly the 
peasants' tools are few and fragile compared to those held by state 
policymakers. Nor do I wish to convey the impression that I think 
that the global economic system.or the class in power or the level 
of technological development are irrelevant. They all clearly have 
some bearing -- yet none have the power to "determinen outcomes. 
Peasant activity is not all-determining either. But it is an 
essential part of the complex and multidimensional process through 
which all men, and women and children, make history. 
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Comments on Panel on 
"Subordinate Actors and their Marginalization in Social Theoryn 
Mayfair Yang 
Department of Anthropology 
university of California, Santa Barbara 
Center for Chinese Studies 
University of Michigan 
I am pleased to comment on an excellent and thematically well- 
integrated panel of papers on marginalization. I will begin with 
the first paper--jointly written by three research fellows: 
Nilufer Isvan, Akos Rona-Tas, and Cynthia Buckley of the 
Sociology Department--which is a theoretical statement succinctly 
summing up the panel's main theme. 
The paper addresses the fact that, contrary to the 
assumptions and predictions of both Marxist and non-Marxist 
progressivism (forms of modernization theory), many anomalous 
socio-economic features continue to be vibrant in the modern 
world, yet they are given only marginal status by our reigning 
forms of understanding. Examples of marginality treated in this 
paper are forms of production and exchange such as the household 
production of wheat, small owner-operated farms, artisans, and 
informal labor exchange in advanced capitalism; the second 
economy in state-planned economies; and the informal sector in 
the capitalist Third World. 
Three important point are made about the marginalization of 
- 
social phenomena. First, that marginalization operates at two 
distinct yet interrelated levels, the perceptual and the 
epistemological. The perception that certain social practices do 
not belong to what is deemed to be the core of reality is in part 
produced by the very epistemological (or representational) 
categories that have been constructed to apprehend reality. In 
turn, the perceptual creation of margins invents and confirms the 
epistmological apparatus. 
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Second, both levels of marginalization are achieved through 
"egocentric dichotomization of the world." Dichotomies are not 
constructed from some abstract mid-point between two poles, but 
always from the vantage point of the Self, which is privileged as 
the point of departure from which an opposite is defined. This 
is a point well taken, in that to see the world in dichotomies is 
to reduce the world to something other than oneself (non-modern, 
mechanical solidarity, folk, Gemeinschaft, etc.). ' Hence, many 
features of the world that do not fit into a dualistic schema are 
left out of core reality and theory to languish at the margins. 
Third, what I especially like about the paper is that it 
does not stop at the issue of dichotomization, but also 
criticizes the "historicization of the Othern in terms of the 
Self, or the temporal construction of dichotomies. The problem 
of writing other. people's history in terms of an opposition to' 
oneself is that the margins are given someone else's history 
instead of their own. They are given an inevitable path of 
social change based on the trajectory of Western history. . This 
problem is found in the models which posit that either the 
universal market or central bureaucracy will eventually dominate, 
along with large-scale production, wage labor, centralization, 
and standardization. What these models of history fail to take 
into account is that margins are not anachronistic survivals of 
the past, but ongoing developments in the present, changing and 
developing in response to he modern world. Margins make use of 
and are produced by the very structures which are supposed to 
erase them from the present (new technologies, large-scale 
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industrialization). Thus, implicit in this paper is the 
recognition that the survival of the past in the present is not a 
sign of backwardness, but a critique of the present, or a way of 
coping with it. 
I do have a few questions for the authors' consideration. 
You still seem to want tomaintain the various dichotomies 
instead of throwing them out completely in favor of tripartite 
schemes, or better yet, models of multiple strands, themes and 
developmental directions. Is it that you see merit in 
maintaining the core-margin relationship? Is it that you think 
it is still fruitful to posit a dominant set of institutions and 
contrast it with a set of informal, unrecognized set of 
practices? Or can the marginal and the anomalous be seen as the 
basis for constructing a new core and new trajectories so that 
margins can also be regarded as primary processes instead of 
secondary ones? What prevents you from seeing margins as a 
certain dimension of core institutions hitherto unnoticed and 
peripheralized? 
Finally, the relationship between core institutions and 
their logic, and that of marginal practices, needs to be 
addressed. The specific relationships of opposition, 
interpenetration, accommodation or supplementation between 
margins and core need to be examined in detail. 
4 
It is this relationship of the marginal second economy to the 
Hungarian state, which Akos Rona-Tas' paper explores, a 
relationship which the paper asserts is one of opposition. The 
argument is that the second economy is a form of political 
resistance just like a full-fledged social movement, although it 
possesses no formal ideology, no explicit intention of resistance 
and no formal organization. 
I would like to single out two insightful points this paper 
makes which I think are especially pertinent to understanding 
state socialist societies. First, in the structuring of state 
socialist societies, there is a deep blurring of boundaries 
between the political and economic spheres. This feature, I 
believe, is what makes Rona-Tas' argument that the second eocnomy 
is a "political category" especially compelling, even though the 
second economy's agents and actions do not understand themselves 
in political terms. 
The special interpenetration of political and economic 
spheres in this type of society produces a marked irony in the 
relationship between the state and the second economy. The irony 
lies in the fact that, on the one hand, the state convinces 
itself that it is interested in production and economy when it is 
actually more interested in state control and the politicization 
of culture and the economy. Economy, then, is an extension of 
the state and that is why the state would also like to control 
the second economy. On the other hand, the second economy thinks 
of itself as a series of economic transactions when it is 
actually, in its effects, political action countering state 
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power. By loosening the state's control over their livelihood, 
the second economy is a form of politics. Thus, this irony of 
the disjunction between intentions and effects underscores how 
the political and the economic are only aspects of each other. 
A second point well taken by the paper is that the reason 
why resistance takes this guise is because visible organizations 
or movements of resistance have not accomplished anything in the 
past and have, in fact, proven dangerous until the recent changes 
of the late 1980's. Formal organizations have proven to be easy 
targets of state repression or have been coopted into the state, 
as the example of the Hungarian Trade Union and the Church show. 
Therefore, argues Rona-Tas, resistance works through the 
unintentional consequences and through the cumulative actions of 
"atomized individuals," each simply thinking about their own 
livelihood instead of concerted poltical action. 
It is at this point that I would like to take issue with the 
paper's analysis of the mechanism of such resistance. Although 
the second economy does produce resistance effects through 
unintended consequences, it seems to me that it does not mean 
that it does so through the aggregation of isolated individual 
actions. What also makes up the second economy are sets of 
relationships--between buyer and seller, between producer and the 
supplier of raw materials, between small entrepreneur and the 
state. The second economy produces a logic, culture, and 
discourse of its own which means that it is more than individual 
actions. People talk about the second economy; in the process 
they interpret it in certain ways, give it meaning, ascribe 
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certain political and social attitudes, and they learn how to 
behave in its practice. The case of peasants killing their pigs 
and feasting on them rather than turning them over to the state 
is an example of how there is communication involved in such 
forms of resistance. Perhaps the mechanism of'uncoordinated and 
unorganized individual actions with unintended consequences needs 
to be enriched by a notion of culture, or, in this case, counter- 
culture. As it stands, the chaos theory model implies actors who 
do not interpret or communicate their actions, who do not produce 
a discourse or certain shared practices and attitudes beyond 
isolated decisions concerning their material livelihood. 
So I would not share the paper's concern that the 
atomization of society by the state is reinforced by a second 
economy which encourages people to improve their lot 
individually. Since to do well in the second economy, one has to 
depend on certain others and engage in exchange activities with 
them, it would seem that the second economy could only help 
multiply and strengthen the social relationships outside of the 
state, which are necessary for the emergence of a relatively 
independent civil society. 
Theresa Deussen's paper attempts to redress the marginalization 
of an important social category too often left out of 
sociological and political scientific analyses, that of the 
peasantry. She proposes some alternative ways of analyzing 
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socialist Cuban state and peasant relations instead of the usual 
big-state-passive-peasant model. She hopes to avoid teleological 
models of change which assume some inevitable forces determining 
state policy decisions. Examples of teleological models are 
those which posit that policy changes are determined simply by 
economic contingencies arising out of a planned economy or 
intruding from the world economy, or models which give primacy to 
a vision of history as proceeding through inevitable and 
ultimately convergent stages of economic development. 
Furthermore, the paper is also critical of the elitist top-down 
,I< perspective which reduces the complex process of social change to 
the influence of key figures and documents of the state, or of a 
new or old ruling class. 
What Deussen would like to see is a "bottom-up" study of 
social transformation and state policy changes. The two micro- 
level sites of analysis she highlights seem to me very pertinent 
and they promise to open up the discussion of rural state 
socialism out of its stultifying straitjacket of totalizing and 
elitist discourse. First, she wants to examint peasant household 
strategies vis-a-vis state rural policies. Peasants are arranged 
into sociological units of households, within which and for which 
economic decisions affecting state policies are made about what 
to grow, how much to grow, where to sell, division of labor, etc. 
The outcome of peasant household strategies may engage the state 
in terms of resistance or compliance. 
Second, she also thematizes an important element of state- 
peasant relations, gender as a variable factor in changing state 
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policies. It has been found that women peasants tend to be more 
willing to join state-supported cooperatives than men because it 
enables them to gain independence from husbands and fathers and 
gives them a degree of financial independence. In my own area of 
research, China, there are signs that in some ways the rural 
decollectivization of 1979 has benefitted men more than women. 
Going back to the household mode of production and peasant 
entrepreneurship has sometimes meant the reinstatement of 
patriarchal power within the family, and women being left to work 
in the home and fields while men travel to nearby towns and meet 
the larger world. Therefore, state policies affect peasants 
differently according to gender and, likewise,  peasants respond 
to the sate in different ways according to gender. The 
implication of the gender dimension is that peasant-gender 
relations and conflicts have important repercussions for the 
formulation and implementation of state policies. 
While I think Deussen's proposals for alternative approaches 
to studying peasant-state relations are laudable, there are many 
more angles from the micro-level which could be highlighted. For 
example, the conflict between different social units of 
integration or relationship, such as those between peasant 
families and the state, and between local village or community 
and the state, could be a fruitful avenue of investigation into 
peasant-state relations. These differences in levels and units 
of social integration express themselves in terms of conflicting 
loyalties to families, locality and nation-state and in efforts 
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by peasants to foreground local commitments over the interests of 
the state. 
Another angle worth pursuing in efforts to open up a micro- 
level analysis of state-peasant relations is the examination of 
different levels of the state and their varying responses to 
peasant interests and strategies. The crucial level of course is 
the lowest level of the state, rural officials who themselves are 
part of local peasant communities. It would be interesting to 
explore the various strategies peasants actively employ to try to 
win these officials to their side, and to see how the responses 
of these local officials to peasants affect higher levels of the 
state, resulting in state policy changes. 
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